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China has recently announced its intention to fundamentally reform its currency regime in the future. This 
paper studies how the country’s choice of its exchange rate regime interacts with the rest of East Asia’s 
choice. For that purpose, I build a four country new open economy macroeconomic model that consists of 
East Asia, China, Japan and the US. It is assumed that both East Asia and China peg their respective 
currencies to certain weighted averages of the Japanese yen and the US dollar. Each side takes the other’s 
choice as given and chooses its own basket weight. The game is characterized by strategic complementarity. 
It is shown that the currency in which the traded goods prices are quoted plays an important role. The 
paper considers two alternative cases, the standard producer currency pricing (PCP) case and the vehicle 
currency pricing (VCP) case in which all the prices of traded goods are preset in the units of US dollars. In 
the PCP case, trade volume is the important determinant of the equilibrium basket weights, and the 
balances of trade are inconsequential. However, in the VCP case, trade balances between the four 
economies are shown to play an important role. Under VCP, and starting from realistic initial trade 
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1 Introduction 
 
China has recently announced its intention to fundamentally reform its currency regime in the future. 
This paper studies how China’s choice of its exchange rate regime affects the rest of East Asia’s choice, and 
vice versa. For that purpose, I build a four country new open economy macroeconomic model that consists 
of East Asia, China, Japan and the US. It is assumed that both East Asia and China peg their respective 
currencies to a basket of the Japanese yen and the US dollars. I consider a game between the two 
economies in which each side takes the other’s choice as given and chooses its own basket weights so as to 
minimize influences of foreign (Japanese and US) shocks to its own current account. This game exhibits 
strategic complementary.   
The paper derives the Nash equilibrium of this game under various alternative setups. It is shown that 
the currency in which traded goods’ prices are quoted plays an important role. The paper considers two 
alternative cases, the standard producer currency pricing (PCP) case and the vehicle currency pricing 
(VCP) case in which all the prices of traded goods are preset in the units of US dollars. In the PCP case, 
trade volume is the important determinant of the equilibrium basket weights, and the balances of trade 
are inconsequential. However, in the VCP case, trade balances between the four economies are shown to 
play an important role. Under VCP, and starting from realistic initial trade balances, the equilibrium 
basket weights far exceed what are implied by Japan’s presence in international trade. The paper also 
investigates how this tendency is altered when the industrial structure becomes more similar between East 
Asia and China. 
The rest of the report is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic theoretical framework. Section 
3 presents the model more formally, while section 4 explains the details of the numerical simulation. The 
results of numerical simulations are presented in section 5, and intuitions behind those results are discussed 
in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Overview of the model 
 
The model considered in this paper builds on the framework of Corsetti et al. (2000). Their model in turn 
is based on a two country equilibrium model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995 and 1996). In Obstfeld and 
Rogoff’s “redux” model, each country produces one type of goods (which consists of many varieties). In 
each country, there are households who live for infinite number of periods, who are both consumers and 
monopolistically competitive producers at the same time. They decide today’s consumption and supply of 
labor, which is the sole input into production, so as to maximize their life-time utility, taking into account 
the intertemporal budget constraint. Unlike the international real business cycle models (see, for example, 
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992), this model is characterized by nominal rigidity: nominal prices are 
assumed to be set in advance, and stay unchanged during one period. This means that a pure monetary 
expansion could have real effects and could change the utility level of the locals and foreigners. 
Corsetti et. al. (2000) develop a three country version of the Obstfeld-Rogoff model. In their model, each 
country is specialized in the production of just one type of products (each of which consists of many 
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varieties) and those goods are traded internationally. Consumers live for infinite periods and maximize their 
life time utility. They do not face any borrowing constraint. Their preferences are assumed to be 
“symmetric” across countries, in the sense that consumers in any country spend the same fraction of their 
expenditure on goods produced in a particular country. Firms are monopolistically competitive and set 
nominal prices one period in advance. 
Shioji (2001) develops a modified version of this model and analyzes the welfare effect of a Japanese 
monetary expansion on Asia. He finds that the overall welfare effect was positive. Shioji (2002) generalizes 
this model by incorporating home bias in consumer preference and a fraction of agents that are myopic 
(that is, they simply maximize their periodic utility each period). He finds that the welfare implication of 
the previous paper is weakened but remains qualitatively similar. Shioji (2005) relaxes the assumption that 
each country specializes in production of just one type of product. Instead, it is assumed that there are 
three types of goods that are produced in all three countries (called Asia, Japan and the US): they are 
called “high-tech tradables”, “low-tech tradables”, and “non-tradables”. Using this model, he studies Asia’s 
choice of the optimal basket weights (between the Japanese yen and the US dollars) under the typical 
“producer currency pricing” case and a more typical case in which prices of tradable goods are fixed in the 
short run in the units of the US dollars. 
The model in this paper consists of four “countries”, East Asia, China, Japan, and the US. Japan and 
the US specialize in production of “J goods” and “U goods”, respectively. East Asia and China, on the 
other hand, both produce both of “A1 goods” and “A2 goods”.   
This model is simulated numerically to derive the responses of East Asia and China’s current accounts to 
monetary shocks that originate from either the US or Japan. It is assumed that both Japan and the US are 
under the flexible exchange rate regime, while both East Asia and China adopt basket pegs. First, taking 
China’s choice of basket weights as given, I compute the responses of East Asia’ current account. I will 
investigate under which values of basket weights for East Asia its current account is most stabilized. This 
exercise will be repeated under various values of China’s basket weights. This will enable me to derive a 
reaction function of East Asia to China’s choice. Next, I take East Asia’s choice as given and derive China’s 
reaction function. By studying the features of those reaction functions, we will be able to uncover what 
kind of strategic interaction exists between the two economies. 
This simulation exercise will be conducted under various setups. They differ in the assumptions 
concerning the pricing behaviors regarding traded goods, initial trade balance between the four countries, 
and the industrial structures of East Asia and China. 
In terms of pricing behaviors, I consider two alternative cases. The first is the standard producer 
currency pricing (PCP) case, in which the prices of traded goods remain constant in the short run in the 
units of the exporter country’s currency. The second is called the vehicle currency pricing (VCP) case, 
which means that their prices are preset in the units of US dollars.   
As for initial trade balances, I start from the standard assumption that, prior to the arrival of shocks, 
trade was completely balanced between the four countries. This assumption, however, is not particularly 
realistic when it comes to the relationship between the East Asian countries and the US. In reality, the US 
is running large trade deficits against each of East Asia, China, a n d  J a p a n .  T o  t a k e  t h i s  f a c t  i n t o  
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consideration, I will consider an alternative case in which the initial conditions reflect the reality described 
above. 
I also consider two alternative assumptions regarding the industrial structures of East Asia and China. 
In the benchmark case, East Asia largely specialized in production of A1 goods, while China’s production is 
mostly devoted to A2 goods. Hence their industrial structure is very different from each other. In recent 
years, however, mainly due to the advancement of the machinery sector in China, its trade structure is 
becoming increasingly similar to that of East Asia. To see the effect of such structural changes, in an 
alternative case, it is assumed that both East Asia and China produce mostly A2 goods, and the production 
of A1 goods is at a very low level. Hence, in this case, the two economies are quite similar in their industrial 
structure. 
 
3 The Model 
 
The world consists of four “countries”; US (denoted by U), Japan (denoted by J), China (denoted by C) 
and East Asia (denoted by E). Each country is inhabited by a continuum of households. The numbers of 
households in those countries are all constant, and are denoted by  U γ ,  J γ ,  C γ , and  E γ , respectively. 
Time is discrete and households live for infinite periods of time. There is free flow of goods and bonds 
between the countries. 
 
3-1 Type of Goods 
Goods are classified into four “types”. They are all tradables. First, there are two types of “OECD 
goods”, called “U goods” (denoted by subscript U) and “J goods” (denoted by subscript J). They are 
produced exclusively by the US and Japan, respectively. Second, there are two types of “Asian goods”, 
called “A1 goods” and “A2 goods”. Both of them are produced by both Chinese and East Asian producers. 
Those four types of goods are imperfect substitutes. Each type of goods consists of many “brands”, that 
are imperfect substitutes between each other. Each household specializes in production of just one brand 
of goods, over which it has a monopoly right to produce. This means that the number of brands produced 
is always equal to the number of households.       
There is no investment and all the goods are final consumer goods. We make an assumption on the utility 
function so that all the households decide to consume all brands of goods available to them, that is, all 
brands of tradable goods as well as all non-tradable goods produced in the country they live in. 
 
3-2 Households 
In each period, each household obtains utility from consuming a bundle of consumer goods. It derives 
disutility from working to produce its own brand of consumer goods. It also derives utility from holding 
real money balance. The one-period utility of the household x, that produces type k goods (k=U, J, A1, or 
A2) in country j in period t is assumed to take the following form: 




























The first part represents utility from consumption. The variable  ) (x C
jk
t   is a bundle of consumer goods 
(or the “composite consumption index”) consumed by this household in period t. The exact definition of 
this index will be specified later. The second part represents the disutility of work. The variable  ) (x Y
jk
t  is 
the amount of output produced by this household in period t, using labor as the sole input. The parameter 
κ   (which is assumed to be positive) describes how work effort is related to output: when its value is high, it 
means that productivity is low (more work effort is needed to produce the same amount of output). The 
third part corresponds to the utility from money holding, where  ) (x M
jk
t  is the amount of cash held by 
this household, denoted in the unit of the local currency, while 
j
t P   is the average price level of country j, 
to be specified exactly later. The parameter  χ  is assumed to be positive. The periodic budget constraint 
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In the above, 
j
t E  is the exchange rate of country j (j=U, J, C, or E) in period t. We shall take the US 
dollar as the numeraire so that 
U
t E   =1. The other exchange rates are defined as the value of a US dollar 
in the units of local currency, so an increase in this variable means a depreciation of the local currency 
against the US dollars.  ) ( 1 x B
jk
t+   is the amount of bond held by this household at the end of period t. The 
bonds are denominated in US dollars. The nominal interest rate that accrues to holding this bond between 
periods t-1 and t is denoted by  t i , and this is also measured in US dollars. The assumption of free financial 
capital mobility implies that this value will always be the same across the countries.  ) (x SR
jk
t  is the 
revenue from sales of the goods produced by this household, defined in the units of the local currency. In a 
flexible price equilibrium (long run), law of one price holds, and the sales revenue is equal to the price of 
this brand of goods charged by this monopolistically competitive household (which will be denoted by 
) (x P
jk






t ⋅ = ). In a fixed price 
equilibrium (short run), the domestic price is fixed, while sales prices abroad v a ry  d ep e n d i n g  o n  t h e  
pass-through rate between the seller’s country and the buyer’s country. Finally,  ) (x T
jk
t   is lump sum tax 
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imposed by the government, also defined in the units of the local currency. 
Also, note that, as a producer, each household faces a downward sloping demand curve, as different 
brands of goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. Later, we shall specify exactly how those varieties 
of goods enter into each household’s utility. For the moment, it suffices to know that, in a flexible price 
equilibrium (long run), each household faces the demand curve of the following kind: 
() ()
x jkj k j k
tt t YxPx Z
θ − =⋅ , (3) 
where  x θ  is a sector-specific constant larger than one, whose role in the utility function will be spelled 
out later. And 
jk
t Z   is some variable that is beyond the control of each household.   












(where  β  is the subjective discount factor) subject to the periodic budget constraint and a non-Ponzi 
game condition. 
 
3-3 Equilibrium conditions 
Here, I will discuss equilibrium conditions for the households as a whole. For example, define the average 
consumption of households producing type k goods in country j in period t as the integral of  ) (x C
jk
t  over 
all x. Denote such a variable as 
jk
t C . Define 
jk
t Y , 
jk
t M , and 
jk
t B , in analogous ways for output, money 
holdings, and bond holdings, respectively. Then, by the assumption of symmetry within each household 
group, we obtain 
()
jk jk
tt CC x = ,  ()
jk jk
tt YY x = ,  ()
jk jk
tt M Mx = ,  ()
jk jk
tt B Bx = , (5) 
for all j, k and t. 
In equilibrium, the following three conditions that are derived from individual forward looking 
household’s optimization conditions have to be satisfied at the aggregate level. First, the following Euler 
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The previous two conditions have to be satisfied at all times. When prices are flexible, the following 














−       (for all t, j, and k), (8) 
where  ,
jk
j t P   is the average price index for the type k goods produced and sold in country j by households 
in country j (which will be equal to individual price  ) (x P
jk
t , by symmetry). 
3-4 Equilibrium conditions (government) 
Next, the government’s budget constraint has to be satisfied in equilibrium. In this paper, it is assumed 
that the government’s only role is to print money and to distribute it across households in a lump sum 
fashion. This implies: 






t T M M       (for all t and j),  (9) 
where 
j
t M  and 
j
t T   are money supply and transfer, respectively, in country j in period t. I assume that 
the government supplies the same amounts of money and transfers to households within the same category, 
i.e., those who produce the same type of goods and have the same utility function. Then, writing such 
money supply and transfers per capita to households producing type k goods as 
jk
t M  and 
jk
t T , and the 
population of households producing type k goods in country j as 














3-5 Equilibrium conditions (resource constraint) 
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The world wide net supply of bonds has to be equal to zero: 








t B B B B    (for  all  t).  (16) 
The amount of output produced by each type of household has to equal the demand for the good. That 
is, 
,,,, () () () () ()
jj j j j
tU t J t C t E t Yx D x D x D x D x =+++      (for all x, t and j),  (17) 
where  ) ( , x D
j
t U ,  ) ( , x D
j
t J ,  , ()
j
Ct Dx  and  , ()
j
Et Dx  are demand for output produced by household x in 
country j  that come from the US, Japan, China, and East Asia, respectively. Those demands will be 
specified in detail later. 
 
3-6 Composite consumption indices 
Now I move on to specify contents of each consumption index. In this section, time subscript t is 
omitted for the sake of exposition. The overall consumption index,  ) (x C
jk , is assumed to take the 
following form: 
  () ()
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where  ()
jk
UJ Cx  is itself a composite consumption index of U goods and J goods, and  ()
jk
A Cx  is an 
index for A1 and A2 goods. The parameter  ε   is the elasticity of substitution between tradable goods as a 
whole and non-tradable goods, and  ω ’s are the expenditure share parameters. In turn, 
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where  1 A θ   is the elasticity of substitution between brands within type A1 goods, and   
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where summation inside the brackets is taken over all the A1 brands produced in country i.   
 
3-7 Price indices and demand functions 
The above definitions of consumption indices allow us to appropriately define composite price indices. 
Also, we can derive demand functions that each household faces as a producer of goods. 
 
3-8 Long run vs. Short run equilibrium, and pricing regimes 
In the long run, all the prices are assumed to be flexible and that all the markets clear. In such a case, the 
contemporaneous optimality conditions between consumption and leisure are satisfied for all the 
households: that is, equation (8) is satisfied. In the short run, prices are rigid in the sense that will be 
specified below, and output becomes demand-determined. As a consequence, equation (8) no longer holds. 
In the short run, the nominal prices of domestically produced goods are assumed to be rigid (that is, the 
same as their values in the previous period) in the units of the domestic currency. As for the goods traded 
internationally, in the bench mark case, we assume producer currency pricing (PCP). In this case, the 
traded goods prices are preset in the units of the currency of the country in which they are produced, and 
remain unchanged in the short run. In the alternative case of vehicle currency pricing (VCP), their prices 
are predetermined in the units of US dollars. 
 
4 Description of the Numerical Exercise 
 
4-1 Dynamics of the Model 
In the following analysis, it is assumed that the world economy starts from a flexible price equilibrium 
with constant money supply. All the countries are in the steady state in which all the variables remain 
constant over time. In the benchmark case, it is assumed that all households had zero foreign bonds or 
debts at the outset. This implies, by the nature of steady state, that trade is balanced for each of the four 
countries. In the numerical simulation, I will also choose the parameter values in such a way that exports 
and imports are practically equal for each of the bilateral trade pairs. In the alternative case, I will allow for 
the possibility that there were accumulated assets and debts in the initial steady state, and, as a 
consequence, trade is not necessarily balanced for each country.   
Starting from the steady state of either nature mentioned above, money supply of either the US or 
Japan increases permanently. As East Asia and China are assumed to peg their currencies to a certain 
basket of the US dollar and the Japanese yen, their money supply is also likely to change as endogenous 
responses to the shock3. In the short run, there is price rigidity of one kind or the other, as described in the 
                                                 
3  As stated, population is heterogeneous within East Asia and China, where there are two groups of 
households producing different types of goods. In this case, how money supply is distributed between the two 
household groups could have real influences on the policy effects. In this paper, it is assumed that, in each 
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previous section. As a consequence, the world economy deviates from the long run equilibrium. Output 
becomes demand determined. After one period, prices become fully flexible. The world economy arrives at 
a new flexible price equilibrium, which is likely to be different from the old one. In fact, the world economy 
will automatically jump to the new long run equilibrium immediately. This is the beauty of the approach 
of Corsetti, et.al. (2000): it converts an infinite period model into a virtual two period model, and 
researchers have to worry about only the “short run” (period 1) and the “long run” (period 2 onwards). 
The effects of the policy change are analyzed by computing percentage deviations of the new 
equilibrium from the original steady state, by way of log-linear approximation4. As it is difficult to obtain 
analytical results, I report results from numerical exercises in the next section. 
4-2 Calibration 
The model is calibrated to fit characteristics of data for the US, Japan, China and East Asia on 
production and relative productivity. Data for Asia is computed by aggregating values for Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (Taiwan is omitted due to missing 
data). The actual numbers employed are summarized in Tables 1-5.   
Population 
World population is normalized to equal 1, and each country’s population is chosen to match its actual 
share (among the four economies) in the number of persons employed, as is shown in Table 15.  
Productivity 
The productivity parameters in the last row of Table 1 are chosen to match observed GDP per worker. 
Subjective Discount Factor and the Utility Weight on Money 
As is shown in Table 2, I set the subjective discount factor at 9 . 0 = β . The parameter for money in the 
utility,  χ , is somewhat arbitrarily set at 1. 
Elasticities 
Assumptions on the elasticities of substitution are summarized in Table 2. All the elasticities are set to be 
equal to 2, with the exception of the within-type elasticities between A1 as well as A2 goods, which are set 
to be equal to 5. 
Exchange rate regimes 
It is assumed that both Japan and the US are under flexible exchange rate regimes. China and East Asia, 
on the other hand, employ basket peg regimes in which their nominal exchange rates are fixed against 
weighted averages of the Japanese yen and the US dollars. 
Pricing regimes 
As stated earlier, two cases are considered. In both cases, prices of domestically produced and consumed 
goods are assumed to be constant in the short run. In the “PCP” case, prices of traded goods are constant 
                                                                                                                                                                  
period, initial money supply is (re-)distributed to each household in such a way that it is proportional to 
average per household nominal expenditure of the producer group that the household belongs to during that 
period. This way, monetary policy will not have real effects through a redistributive channel. 
4  As initial bond holdings are assumed to be zero in the benchmark case, we cannot take their log linear 
approximations around the initial values. For those variables, their deviations from the initial values are 
defined as changes in their values from their initial values as ratios to the initial GDP. 
5 Total numbers of workers are estimated by information from the Key Indicators web site of thEast Asian Development Bank. 
10  - 10 -
in the short run in the units of the producer country’s currency. In the “VCP” case, they are preset in the 
units of US dollars. 
Sectoral allocation of workers, or industrial strucure 
As was stated earlier, two alternative assumptions will be made. In the “Distinct” case, 99% of Chinese 
workers will be working in A1 sector, while the corresponding number will be 1%. In the “Similar” case, 
both ratios will be 1%. 
Utility Weights and Initial Surpluses 
In principle, the values of the expenditure share parameters, ω ’s, are chosen to match the actual 
expenditure patterns of the four economies. However, in the data, the East Asian countries enjoy sustained 
trade surpluses, while the US runs trade deficits. To isolate their consequences, I will first abstract from 
their presence in the benchmark case called the “balanced” case, and later compare the results with a more 
realistic case called the “unbalanced” case, in which the presence of initial surpluses and deficits is allowed. 
Table 3A summarizes the parameters used in the “balanced” case. In the table, each row represents a buyer 
country, and each of the first four columns show the values of expenditure share parameters applicable to 
goods sold by each of the four countries. The last column represents the buyer country’s initial deficit (% 
of initial total absorption). The expenditure share parameter in the (i,j) entry of the table (where each of i 
and j represents a country) for this case6  is computed by the following procedure. First, “expenditure by i 
on goods from j” is computed by the formula: ((actual expenditure by i on goods from j) + (actual 
expenditure on goods from i by j))/2. Note this implies that (hypothetical) “expenditure by i from j” and 
“expenditure by j from i” will be equal, by construction. This reflects the notion of bilateral trade balance. 
Then the share parameter (i,j) is set to be equal to this hypothetical expenditure divided by GDP of i. 
Moreover, as the last column of Table 3A shows, the initial trade surplus is restricted to be zero. This is 
ensured by restricting the initial bond holding of each household in each country to be zero7. Of course, as 
the elasticity of substitution between the goods in the model deviates from 1 in the model (see Table 2), and 
the countries are asymmetric (as in Table 1), the bilateral trade in the steady state will not be exactly 
balanced in the resulting steady state. However, as a numerical matter, the steady state bilateral trade in 
this “balanced” case turned out to be very close to actually being balanced.   
In contrast, the parameter values in the “unbalanced” case, summarized in Table 3B in the same 
manner as in Table 3A, are more straightforward reflection of the actual pattern seen in the data. The 
expenditure share parameter in the (i,j) entry is set to be equal to the observed expenditure by country i on 
goods from j divided by i’s total absorption (GDP minus net exports). As shown in the last column, East 
Asia, China and Japan are supposed to be running trade surplus in the initial steady state, while the US 
alone is running deficit. This is ensured by appropriately choosing the values for initial bond holdings. An 
unavoidable consequence is that we have to assume a negative bond holding for a country with initial 
                                                 
6  For example, the parameter for the “share of expenditure ‘by East Asia’ ‘from US’” corresponds to, using the 
model notations, 
E
UJ ω  times 
E
U ω . 
7  This can be seen from equation (2). If bond holding is zero on both sides of the equation, and money supply is 
constant over time (which implies no monetary transfers, from (9)), nominal consumption expenditure and 
sales revenue will be equal for every household. 
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surplus and a positive bond holding for a country with initial deficit, from equation (2) and by the 
requirement of a steady state. This is the cost we have to pay to make the initial trade patterns of the 
model realistic, but it is still an uncomfortable implication, especially given the actual large accumulated 
foreign debt of the US. One way to reconcile this assumption with the reality might be to think of “bonds” 
in the model including non-pecuniary assets in foreign countries, such as political influences, military 
presence, and the ability to collect segniorage as an issuer of a currency used internationally. 
I have not discussed expenditure shares between goods A1 and A2 produced in East Asia and China. The 
parameter values for those shares are chosen so that the share parameter for each type of good will be equal 
to the share of its producers in total population times the country-wide share parameter for each producer 
country.  
Table 1: Parameter values for the calibration exercise (A) 
Population and Productivity 
 East  Asia  China  Japan  US 
Population 0.171  0.649  0.057 0.122 
Productivity 
(square root of 1/κ ) 
1 0.3  15  15 
Table 2: Parameter values for the calibration exercise (B) 
Preference parameters 
Preference parameters:   
Discount factor (β )  0.9 
Utility weight on money (χ )  1 
Elasticities:  
Between (U,J) and (A1, A2)  2 
Between U and J  2 
Between A1 and A2  2 
Within U and Within J  2 
Within A1  5 
Within A2  5 
Table 3: Parameter values for the calibration exercise (C) 
Sectoral allocation of population in East Asia and China 
Percent of total population, in the order of (A1, A2)   
East Asia  China 
“Distinct” case  99, 1  1, 99 
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Table 4: Parameter values for the calibration exercise (D) 
Expenditure share parameters and initial surpluses. 
A. “Balanced” case 
Expenditure share parameters 








surplus (% of 
absorption) 
by E.Asia  75.48%  5.64%  8.74%  10.15%  0.00% 
by China  4.49%  85.03%  4.71%  5.76%  0.00% 
by Japan  1.79%  1.21%  94.77%  2.23%  0.00% 
by US  1.02%  0.73%  1.10%  97.15%  0.00% 
B. “Unbalanced” case 
Expenditure share parameters 








surplus (% of 
absorption) 
by E.Asia  76.96%  4.30%  10.49%  8.25%  5.81% 
by China  5.92%  86.10%  5.17%  2.81%  3.05% 
by Japan  1.58%  1.16%  95.81%  1.46%  2.31% 
by US  1.23%  1.09%  1.47%  96.21%  -2.00% 








benchmark PCP  “distinct”  “balanced” 
alternative VCP  “similar”  “unbalanced” 
 
4-3 Steady State of the Model 
I first derive values of various shares and ratios in the initial steady state. By comparing those with 
actual statistics, we can study how closely the model replicates the actual patterns of production and 
spending. As the pricing regime has no consequence on the steady state allocation, we will be considering 
four types of steady states, depending on whether the sectoral allocation of workers is “distinct” or 
“similar”, and on whether expenditure shares are “balanced” or “unbalanced”. To save space, in Table 6, I 
show only the cases of “distinct and balanced” and “distinct and unbalanced”. “Similar” cases are 
practically identical to those cases. Comparing the table with Table 4 shows that the steady state features 
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Table 6: Steady state expenditures and surpluses of the model. 
A. “Distinct, Balanced” case 
Calibrated expenditure shares 








surplus (% of 
absorption) 
by E.Asia  76.60%  5.49%  8.22%  9.72%  0.00% 
by China  4.69%  85.10%  4.53%  5.64%  0.00% 
by Japan  1.93%  1.26%  94.60%  2.27%  0.00% 
by US  1.08%  0.75%  1.08%  97.10%  0.00% 
B. “Distinct, Unbalanced” case 
Calibrated expenditure shares 








surplus (% of 
absorption) 
by E.Asia  78.17%  4.47%  9.55%  7.81%  4.93% 
by China  5.85%  86.99%  4.59%  2.59%  6.48% 
by Japan  1.76%  1.31%  95.45%  1.51%  1.65% 
by US  1.32%  1.19%  1.41%  96.07%  -2.07% 
 
 
5 Main findings 
 
In this section I report the simulation results. In Figures 1-4, the horizontal axis corresponds to the 
basket weight of China, and the vertical axis represents that of East Asia. Values on the axes are the 
weights of the Japanese yen. Hence, if the value is zero, it means a complete peg to the US dollar, and, if it 
is one, this means a complete peg to the Japanese yen. The two curves in the figures are the reaction curves 
of East Asia and China. The solid curve is the optimal choice of East Asia given China’s choice. As stated 
earlier, “optimal” here is defined as the weight that minimizes the sum of the squared responses of the 
country’s current account to the US and Japanese monetary policy shocks (defined as increases in their 
respective money supply) of equal sizes. The dashed curve is the optimal choice of China given East Asia’s 
choice. The intersection between the two curves is the Nash equilibrium. 
Figure 1 shows the case in which industrial structure is “distinct” between East Asia and China, and 
trade is “balanced”. In all of Figures 1-4, Panel A corresponds to the “PCP” case (hence Figure 1A 
represents the benchmark case of this paper’s analysis), while panel B shows the result for the “VCP” case. 
According to Figure 1A, this game between East Asia and China is characterized by strategic 
complementarity. By applying the usual stability argument, the Nash equilibrium is stable. The same 
features will emerge in all the panels of Figures 1-4. The intuition is the following. Consider East Asia, 
which takes China’s choice as given. When China employs a complete US dollar peg, the share of the 
“dollar area” in overall trade for East Asia is high. East Asia itself thus has a strong incentive to stabilize 
the value of its currency against the US dollars. It still does not wish to employ a complete US dollar peg, 
as Japan accounts for some fraction of its trade (about 35% in the simulation). As China increases the 
Japanese yen’s weight in its basket, East Asia also wishes to increase the yen’s weight in its own basket, for 
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it is as if the fraction of trade with the “yen area” increases. Even if China employs a complete yen peg, 
however, East Asia wishes to retain some weight on US dollars, because it trades with the US as well. As a 
result, the reaction curve is upward sloping with a positive intercept and has a slope less than one. A similar 
argument applies to China. The Nash equilibrium is obtained when the weight of the Japanese yen is 
slightly less than half for both countries, as can be seen in Figure 1A. 
The situation is quite similar in Figure 1B, in which the pricing regime is now “VCP” but everything else 
is the same. The equilibrium weights become slightly higher. 
Figure 2 corresponds to the case in which trade is “unbalanced” but the industrial structure is “distinct”. 
Figure 2A, the “PCP” case, is quite similar to the “balanced” case. However, in Figure 2B, the “VCP” case, 
both reaction curves shift outward compared to Figure 1B, and the equilibrium weights of the yen are 
much higher, exceeding 70%. Hence, the presence of initial trade imbalance is largely irrelevant under 
“PCP”, but it influences the result enormously under “VCP”. 
In Figure 3, initial trade is back to the “balanced” case but now the industrial structure is “similar” 
between East Asia and China. The slopes of the reaction curves suggest that the optimal weight for one 
country becomes more sensitive to the choice of the other in this case. Intuitively, as the competition 
between the two countries becomes severer, each of them has a greater incentive to stabilize the value of its 
currency against the other. The Nash equilibrium itself does not change greatly from Figure 1. It should be 
noted, however, that the equilibrium values are more sensitive to slight shifts in the reaction curves in this 
case. 
Figure 4 shows the result for the case opposite to the benchmark: initial trade is “unbalanced” and 
industrial structure is “similar”. Figure 4A shows that, once again, under the “PCP” case, the equilibrium 
weights are largely unaffected. However, according to Figure 4B, in the “VCP” case, both reaction curves 
shift outward, and the equilibrium weights are much higher. Comparing this figure with Figure 2B, the 




Although the intuition is relatively straightforward in the “PCP” case, in which trade volumes play the 
decisive role, mechanisms behind the results for the “VCP” case require some further investigation. The 
following thought experiment is useful. Suppose, for simplicity, that China employs either the complete US 
dollar peg (thus it is a part of the “dollar area”) or the complete Japanese yen peg (in this case it is a part of 
the “yen area”). On the other hand, East Asia attaches the weight equal to a*100% to the Japanese yen 
and (1-a)*100% to the US dollar. Suppose that the yen depreciated against the US dollar by 1%. What 
happens to the prices of traded goods sold in each country, expressed in the units of that country’s 
currency? Table 7A summarizes the “PCP” case. In this case, as a becomes larger, East Asia can sell its 
products at lower prices in both the yen the dollar areas, while the local prices of the imported goods are 
higher. This case is contrasted with the “VCP” case summarized in Table 7B. In this case, as all the 
imported goods come into a local market with their dollar prices fixed, the only thing that matters is what 
happens to the importer country’s exchange rate against the US dollar. Hence, in East Asia, imported 
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goods prices rise uniformly as the yen’s weight increases in its basket, that is, as its currency is depreciated 
against the US dollar. In Japan, prices of all the imports rise by 1%, wherever they are from. And this 
holds no matter what happens to East Asia’s basket weight of the Japanese yen, as the goods coming from 
East Asia are always priced in US dollars. In contrast, in the US, prices of all the imports are unchanged, 
because they are all priced in US dollars. 
Table 7: Response of the prices of traded goods in the market in which they are sold (in the units of that 
country’s currency) to a one percent depreciation of the yen against the dollar (in %) 
A. PCP case 
Goods exported from     
East 
Asia 
Yen Area  Dollar Area 
East 
Asia 
--- -(1-a)  a 
















-a -1  --- 
B. VCP case 
Goods exported from     
East 
Asia 
Yen Area  Dollar Area 
East 
Asia 
--- a  a 
















0 0  --- 
As a further thought experiment, assume that the price elasticities of imports are all constant and that 
they are equal across all the goods and the markets. Denote this elasticity by e. Also denote the initial 
exports from East Asia to the yen area and to the dollar area by E¥ and E$, respectively, and its initial 
imports from those areas by I¥ and I$, respectively. Then, under “PCP”, East Asia’s trade balance changes 
by e times the following amount: 
{ } { } ¥$ ¥ $ (1 ) (1 ) aE a E aI a I −− + − − −    (22) 
















+ ,   (23) 
where   ¥¥ ¥ TEI ≡+  and  $$ $ TEI ≡+ . 
This is the “trade volume weighted” basket weight. Under “VCP”, East Asia’s trade balance changes by 
e times the following amount: 
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{ } { } ¥$¥ $ 10 E E aI aI −⋅ + ⋅ − +     (24) 








+ .       ( 2 5 )  
 
Note that, in this case, exports to the dollar area disappear from the right hand side. Also, comparison 
between equations (23) and (25) reveals that an increase in imports from Japan increases the yen’s 
“optimal” weight under “PCP”, but decreases it under “VCP”, holding other things equal. The above 
results imply two things. First, when bilateral trade is balanced in every direction (that is, E¥=I¥ and 
E$=I$), both “PCP” and “VCP” give the same weight: that is, the pricing regime does not matter. Second, 
when there is initial trade imbalance, it does not affect  *PCP a   as long as trade volumes  (T¥  and  T$)  are 



















−+ − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ,    (27) 
Thus, holding trade volumes (T¥ and T$) constant, a*VCP is increasing in trade surpluses against both 
the yen area and the dollar area. As East Asia runs a trade surplus against the US (while trade against 
Japan is closer to being balanced) in the more realistic “unbalanced” case of the numerical analysis, its 
optimal weight of the yen is likely to be higher than under the “balanced” case. By the same argument, the 
optimal weight of the yen for China tends to be higher under the “unbalanced” case than under the 
“balanced” case. Those are the basic reasons why the reaction curves for both countries shift outward when 
we move from Figure 1B to Figure 2B, or from Figure 3B to Figure 4B, while the same tendency is not 
observed under the “PCP” case. 
As a more subtle issue, the expressions in (27) suggest that the slopes of the reactions curves in the 
“VCP” case depend on the bilateral trade balance between East Asia and China. In the “unbalanced” case 
of the numerical simulation, East Asia runs an initial trade surplus against China. In Figures 2B and 4B, as 
China increases its basket weight on the yen, it is as if East Asia’s surplus against the dollar area shrinks 
while its surplus against the yen area increases. Comparing Figures 2B with 1B, or 4B with 3B, we learn 
that the presence of this effect makes East Asia’s reaction to China’s strategy more sensitive. The opposite 
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7 Conclusions 
This paper has utilized a new open economy macroeconomic model to analyze the strategic interaction 
between China and East Asia in their choices of basket weights. The game is characterized by strategic 
complementarity. When the assumptions on the pricing regime and initial trade imbalances are combined 
with each other, they alter the equilibrium values greatly. In the realistic case in which the prices of traded 
goods are preset in the units of US dollars, and Asian countries run large trade surpluses against the US, 
the equilibrium basket weights of the yen tend to be much higher than otherwise. 
This model can be used to predict the future course of the exchange rate regimes in overall East Asia. For 
example, it is widely expected that Japan’s trade surplus is going to shrink in the near future due to the 
quickly aging population. If this happens, the analysis in the paper suggests that the equilibrium basket 
weights on the Japanese yen are likely to be even higher. 
This paper focused exclusively on the positive aspects of the game between East Asia and China. Future 
work needs to consider the normative aspects as well. Also, more detailed investigations on the roles of 
industrial structure need to be conducted. 
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Figure 1: Reaction curves for East Asia and China, 
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Figure 2: Reaction curves for East Asia and China, 
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Figure 3: Reaction curves for East Asia and China, 
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Figure 4: Reaction curves for East Asia and China, 
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